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In April 2006, the Massachusetts Legislature passed Chapter 58 of
the Acts of 2006, An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality,
Accountable Health Care, sweeping health reform legislation designed to
achieve nearly universal health insurance coverage.I While
Massachusetts is not the first state in recent years to enact legislation
intended to achieve near-universal coverage, its efforts have attracted the
most national attention and the most notice from other states interested in
duplicating the Massachusetts Model.
Fortuitous political and budgetary circumstances converged in
Massachusetts to move reform forward. First, stakeholders and elected
officials worked together over a number of years to develop a political
consensus that the goal of health care reform should be universal
coverage-or at least near universal coverage-and that anything short
Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law Center for Health Law Studies.
Professor, Department of Health Management and Policy, Saint Louis University School of
Public Health.
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Saint Louis University John Cook School
of Business.
Professor, Department of Economics, Saint Louis University John Cook School of
Business.
Our thanks to the other members of the Saint Louis University Health Policy team who
collaborated with us on this project: Dan Gentry, Michael Counte and Nicolas Terry. We also wish
to thank the other members of the Saint Louis University Health Policy Legislative Analysis Team
for their suggestions and guidance of the research that serves as the basis for this article. In
particular, Kathy Gillespie, Rick Kurz and Kanak Gautum provided comments and suggestions. We
also appreciate the excellent research contributed by Research Assistants Rebecca Frigy, Sarah
Kaufman, Tameka Stigers, Emily Simpson, and Tanchica Terry. This work was supported by a
grant from the Missouri Foundation for Health. Our thanks to Thomas McAuliffe and Leslie Reed
for their ongoing support and encouragement.
1. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, ch. 58, 2006
Mass. Acts (forthcoming), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslasO69/51060058.htm
[hereinafter An Act Providing Access to Health Care].
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of that goal would have undesirable human, financial, economic and
political costs.2 Moreover, the Commonwealth already allocated over $1
billion a year to cover the costs of care for the uninsured, money that
could be partially or fully shifted to help subsidize health insurance
coverage for low income families in a system designed to create near
universal coverage.3 Finally, the threatened loss of $385 million in
federal Medicaid matching funds on July 1, 2006, helped propel the
Commonwealth to quickly enact reform legislation quickly.4
From this perfect storm of political events emerged the
Massachusetts Model: an incremental health reform package designed to
move the state to near-universal health insurance without disrupting
existing coverage. The Massachusetts Model builds on the existing
private health insurance system, both employer-sponsored and
individual, leverages federal Medicaid funds to help support Medicaid
coverage and private insurance subsidies for lower income
Massachusans, and does not require substantial new state revenue
funding. With these design features, it is not surprising that the
Massachusetts Model has attracted widespread interest.
However, before attempting to replicate the Massachusetts Model,
state lawmakers must explore two basic questions. First, what are the
legal frameworks that support the Massachusetts Model, and how might
other states adapt these structures? Descriptions of the legislation
describe a dizzying array of newly authorized regulatory entities that
administer various elements of the reform plan. What are the basic legal
and regulatory structures that underlie the Massachusetts Model and how
can other states duplicate them?
Second, what is the Massachusetts Model likely to cost in other
states? Since no other state has a $1 billion Uncompensated Care Pool
that can be shifted from charity care to health insurance coverage, do
other states have funds that can be shifted from covering uncompensated
care to funding health insurance expansions? In short, can other states
afford to replicate the Massachusetts Model?
This article examines both questions using Missouri as a prototype.
This work is the outgrowth of an interdisciplinary project to analyze the
feasibility-both legal and financial-of using the Massachusetts Model
2. See John McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform,
HEALTH AFF., WEB ExCLUSIVES, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at w420, w429.
3. See generally John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A
Look at the Issues, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVES, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at W432, 432.
4. McDonough et al., supra note 2, at W429.
1332 [Vol. 55
THE ROAD FROM MASSACHUSETTS TO MISSOURI
to create near universal access to health insurance in Missouri.5 That
research was intended to prompt a policy and political dialogue within
the state of Missouri.
Missouri is an ideal focus for this work because of the lessons it
offers to other states: Missouri is a "bell weather" state that predicts
policy and political trends across the country. As a health care
trendsetter, Missouri was a leader in expanding health insurance for
children. In 1998, it was one of the first states to raise children's
eligibility for the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
and Medicaid to 300% of the federal poverty level (FPL).6 In 2005,
Missouri was also a leader in Medicaid retrenchment, cutting over
100,000 people from Medicaid to trim a budget buffeted by an economic
downturn.7 Today, Missouri is at the forefront of debates about using
public-private partnerships to restructure Medicaid. 8  What happens-
and what can happen-in Missouri offers important lessons about what is
possible and what is likely in other states.
Part I of this article describes who has health insurance and who does
not to help policy-makers gain a better understanding of who the
uninsured are and the kinds of health insurance expansion strategies that
states need to consider. Part II explains the legal frameworks that
underlie the Massachusetts Model and the legal structures other states
need to replicate it. Part III calculates the costs-both positive and
negative-of instituting a Massachusetts Model in Missouri. It also
explores how states, like Missouri, that are reluctant to impose state
individual and corporate income taxes can finance the state's costs
through more targeted taxes on medical services, insurance premiums,
and tobacco products.
5. This research was funded by the Missouri Foundation for Health, a not for profit foundation
founded in 2000 whose mission is to empower the people of the communities they serve to achieve
equal access to quality health services that promote prevention and encourage healthy behaviors.
6. See TIMOTHY MCBRIDE ET AL., THE MISSOURI HEALTH LANDSCAPE: HOW DOES IT
COMPARE TO MASSACHUSETTS? 14 (2006), http://www.mffh.org/MissouriHealthCareLandscape.pdf
(stating that, in 2001, Missouri implemented SCHIP coverage for families with incomes up to 300%
of the FPL); Letter from Kathryn G. Allen, Director, Health Care-Medicaid and Private Health
Insurance Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, to Christopher S. Bond, U.S. Senator (July 25,
2001), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01993r.pdf (showing that only four states, as of 2001,
allowed SCHIP enrollment when a family's income was 300% or more of the FPL).
7. DONNA COHEN ROSS & LAURA COX, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED: STATE CHOICES
INFLUENCE HEALTH COVERAGE ACCESS FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 9 (2005), http://www.
kff.org/medicaid/upload/In-a-Time-of-Growing-Need-State-Choices-Influence-HealthCoverage-
Access-for-Children-and-Families-Report.pdf. Tennessee was the leader, cutting over 200,000
adults. Id.
8. See generally MEDICAID REFORM COMMISSION REPORT 35-36, http://www.senate.mo.gov/
medicaidreform/MedicaidReformCommFinal-122205.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID REPORT]
(discussing transformation toward a public-private system).
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Our study concludes that while the costs of implementing the
Massachusetts Model in a state like Missouri are substantial they are not
prohibitive in terms of the state dollars required. Federal Medicaid
matching funds pay for one-half to two-thirds of the cost of health
insurance expansions to cover low income residents. While no state has
a charity care pool as large as Massachusetts, Missouri spends over $600
million a year to fund uncompensated care, 9 money that could be shifted
to subsidize health insurance coverage. Although Missouri-like every
state other than Massachusetts-would need new state revenue to fund a
Massachusetts Model, the amounts required are relatively modest when
compared to overall state revenues. 10 Ultimately, we conclude that the
Massachusetts Model offers a good investment for Missouri and other
states.
I. THE HEALTH INSURANCE LANDSCAPE: UNDERSTANDING WHO
NEEDS INSURANCE
In 2004, the most recent year for which data is available, health
insurance coverage in Massachusetts and Missouri looked strikingly
similar and better than the national average. Nationwide, almost 18% of
Americans-45.5 million people-were uninsured at some point during
the year." However, both Massachusetts and Missouri had relatively
low rates of uninsurance-12.7% in Massachusetts and 13.6% in
Missouri.' 2 In both states, this relatively rosy picture was the result of
strong employer-sponsored insurance coverage: 67.7% in Massachusetts
and 65.1% in Missouri compared to 61% nationally.' 3 Both states also
had robust individual insurance markets covering 4.8% of residents in
Massachusetts and 5.4% in Missouri compared to 2.3% nationally.' 4
Both states also had sturdy Medicaid programs, with enrollment rates
that mimicked the national average: 13.5% in Massachusetts and 13.8%
in Missouri compared to 13.4%, nationally.1 5
9. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG ET AL., THE COST OF CARE FOR MISSOURI'S UNINSURED (2006),
http://www.mffh.org/CoverMoDataBook2.pdf.
10. See infra text accompanying note 124.




15. Id. In 2005, the Missouri legislature enacted dramatic Medicaid cuts, eliminating coverage
for over 100,000 people. ROSS & COX, supra note 7, at 9. Between January 2005 and January 2007,
the number of eligible Medicaid enrollees fell from 1,001,999 to 825,378. Missouri Department of
Social Services, Caseload Counter Historical Data (2007), http://www.dss.mo.gov/mis/clcounter/
history.htm. Although data is not yet available showing how these cuts affected overall insurance
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Source: Urban Institute & Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured, CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplements (2005).
In both Massachusetts and Missouri-as across the U.S.-over 80%
of the uninsured are workers and their dependents. 16 While the country
as a whole saw precipitous drops in employer-sponsored coverage from
2001-2004, Massachusetts still reported that 84% of the uninsured were
workers or their dependents. 17 In Missouri, the figure was 81%.18
rates in the state, most commentators believe that the cuts to parents' and children's eligibility
increased uninsurance rates among these two groups because prior experience with Medicaid shows
that these groups are unlikely to move from Medicaid into employer-sponsored private insurance
coverage. Ross & Cox, supra note 7, at 9. While the Missouri data presented in this section uses
insurance statistics from 2004 that do not reflect these Medicaid cuts, estimates of the costs of
implementing a Massachusetts Model in Missouri factor in the costs of covering these newly
uninsured Missourians.
16. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
17. Id.
18. Id. Although Missourians, like other Americans have seen a substantial drop in employer-
sponsored coverage between 2000 and 2004 because of the overall economic slump, Missouri's rate
of employer sponsored coverage is still above the national average. See JOHN HOLAHAN & ALLISON
COOK, MIssouRi FOUNDATION FOR HEALTH, THE MIssouR ECONOMY AND CHANGES IN HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE, 2000-2004, at 3 (2006) (listing Missouri's rate of employer-sponsored







Figure 2. Uninsured Workers by Firm Size in
Massachusetts and Missouri
Massachusetts • Missouri
Less1000 or 1000 or than 25
more - more 47%
than 25 12%/249% 25-99
15% 14%
Source: Timothy McBride, et al., The Missouri Health Landscape, How Does
it Compare to Massachusetts? (2006).
While over a quarter of uninsured workers are employed by very
large businesses, most uninsured workers work for small firms.19 In
Missouri, 61% of uninsured workers work for firms with fewer than 100
workers and almost half (47%) work for very small firms with fewer than
25 workers.20 One reason for high uninsurance rates among small firm
workers is that smaller firms are less likely to offer employer sponsored
coverage. In Massachusetts, 56.2% of employees who work for very
small businesses are offered insurance, in Missouri the figure drops to
only 41.2%.21 By comparison, over 90% of employees who work for
firms with more than 50 employees are offered insurance.
19. KAISER COMM'N ON KEY FACTS, UNINSURED WORKERS IN AMERICA 1 (2004), http://www.
kff.org/uninsured/upload/Uninsured-Workers-in-America.pdf. Nationally, 62% of uninsured
workers are employed by firms with less than 100 people. Id. (see Figure 1). This figure does not
include self-employed workers. Id.
20. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 6, at 11.
21. Id. at 8 tbl.6. Smaller business is used here to denote employers who hire less than fifty
employees. Id. Overall, only 53% of Missouri private firms offer their employees health insurance
as compared to about 57% nationwide. Id. This is because, in recent years, employment in Missouri
has shifted to smaller firms, which are less likely to offer insurance coverage. HOLAHAN & COOK,
supra note 18, at 11.
22. McBRIDE ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 tbl.6.
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In terms of age, the group most likely to lack insurance is young
adults, ages 19-34. In Massachusetts, 39% of those in this age group did
not have insurance. In Missouri, the figure is 44%.24 Young adults
have unique issues in terms of health insurance coverage that explain this
trend. Some are students who have aged out of their parents' dependent
coverage and are not yet in the work force. Others are entering the work
force for the first time in low wage or small firm jobs that do not offer
health insurance. Still others have access to employer-sponsored
insurance or individual insurance but decide the premium is too high in
light of their relatively low risk of getting sick-a particular issue with
healthy young men.
Figure 3. The Uninsured by Age in
Massachusetts and Missouri
Massachusetts * Missouri
Age 55- Age 55.
8% Children 64 Children
20% 10% 14%





Source: Allison Cook, Health Insurance Coverage and the Uninsured in
Massachusetts, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Foundation (2005); Allison
Cook, Health Insurance Coverage in Missouri, Missouri Foundation for Health (2004).
Overwhelmingly, though, those who are uninsured are the working
poor or near-poor: About half (49%) of the uninsured in Missouri earn
under 200% of the FPL, and fully 70% have incomes below 300% of the
23. ALLISON COOK, URBAN INSTIT., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND THE UNINSURED IN
MASSACHUSETTS 18 fig.4 (2005), http://www.bcbsmafoundation.org/foundationroot/en-US/docu
ments/uninsuredChartbook05.pdf.
24. HOLAHAN & COOK, supra note 18, at 14 app.B. In Missouri, about 60% of the increase in
the uninsured between 2000 and 2004 was among adults between the ages of nineteen and thirty-
four, largely due to declines in employer-sponsored insurance coverage. See id. (noting a decline in
employer-sponsored insurance).
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FPL.25 In Massachusetts, among the uninsured 41% have incomes below
200% of the FPL and 61% have incomes below 300%.26 Missouri has a
higher percentage of lower income residents without insurance because
Missouri is a poorer state: Its citizens earn less than those in
Massachusetts, with the median income in Missouri $8,000 less than in
Massachusetts. 27 In Missouri, 34% of residents earn below 200% of the
FPL compared with 30% in Massachusetts.
28




<100%FPL 400-499% FPL <100%









10% 200-299% 100-199%200-299% FPL FPL
FPL 21% 26%
20%
Source: Timothy McBride, Saint Louis University School of Public Health,
analysis of CPS 2003-2004 data for non-elderly.
Yet, focusing just on the FPL as an indicator of financial need
obscures regional variations in the cost of living. While 22% of
Missourians earn too little to meet their basic needs-a large percentage
and troubling figure-the numbers are even higher in Massachusetts:
almost a third (31%) of Massachusetts residents earn too little to meet
their basic needs.29 A family of four in Boston needs $64,000-almost
300% of the FPL-to pay for basic living expenses without factoring in
25. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-9 (discussing statistics resulting from Timothy
McBride's analysis of CPS 2003-2004 data on the non-elderly population).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id.
29. Economic Policy Institute, Basic Family Budget Calculator (2007), http://www.epinet.org/
content.cfm/datazonefambud budget [hereinafter Family Budget Calculator].
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health insurance premiums or other medical costs. 30  That same family
can meet their basic needs in St. Louis-not counting health insurance
premiums or out-of-pocket medical costs--earning $41,000, a little over
200% of the FPL.3' Cost of living differences are even more dramatic in
rural areas. A family of four in rural Massachusetts needs to earn
$55,560-two and one half times the FPL-to meet basic needs without
counting health costs. 32 That same family in rural Missouri can get by on
about $31,000 or one and a half times the FPL.3 3
Regional variations in cost of living may help explain why nearly
25% of Massachusans who lacked health insurance prior to passage of
the Chapter 25 of the Acts of 2006 had incomes above 500% of the FPL,
an income of $100,000 for a family of four. In 2006, the annual
premium for employer-sponsored health insurance averaged $11,480 for
a family of four.34 This average premium cost is slightly more than the
income for a full time minimum wage worker, almost 20% of the gross
income of a family of four earning 300% of the FPL or $60,000 a year,
and almost 12% of the gross income of a family of four earning 500% of
the FPL.35 Such premiums certainly price out those living at or under
300% of the FPL, but they can also price out those earning even higher
incomes in high cost areas like Massachusetts.36
This survey of the health insurance landscape explains why states
need a range of insurance expansion strategies to address different
income, age, and employment demographics amongst the uninsured.
First, expanding health insurance coverage requires mechanisms to
30. SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO, ECON. POL'Y INSTIT., BASIC FAMILY BUDGETS: WORKING
FAMILIES' INCOMES OFTEN FAIL TO MEET LIVING EXPENSES AROUND THE U.S. 6 (2005),
http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/bp165.
31. Family Budget Calculator, supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. Id. The 2004 federal poverty guideline for a family of four in the continental United States
was $18,850. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services (2004), http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/
04poverty.shtml [hereinafter 2004 Poverty Guidelines].
34. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY 1-2 (2006), www.kff.org/insurance/
7527/upload/7527.pdf [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY]. Single coverage averaged about $4,242
a year. Id.
35. ld. at 18.
36. An Urban Institute analysis, based on the previous experiences of Hawaii, Minnesota,
Tennessee, and Washington, suggests that premiums equal to 5% of income will price more than
80% of potentially eligible families out of Medicaid. Leighton Ku & Teresa Couglin, Sliding-Scale
Premium Health Insurance Programs: Four States' Experiences, 36 INQUIRY 471, 477 (1999); see
also LEIGHTON KU & VICTORIA WACHINO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, THE EFFECT OF
INCREASED COST-SHARING IN MEDICAID: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 7-9 (2005),
http://www.cbpp.org/5-13/05health2.pdf (reviewing the effect of premiums on Medicaid
participation in several states).
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subsidize health insurance premiums for those who cannot afford the full
cost. Those with incomes below 100% of the FPL certainly need
assistance. However, families with incomes between 200 and 300% of
the FPL also have little-if any-income left after meeting other
necessary expenses to cover health insurance premiums. Substantial
premium support is needed to make health insurance affordable for these
lower income Americans.
Second, workers of modest means earning between 300 and 500% of
the FPL, particularly those employed by small firms, also have difficulty
finding affordable health insurance. Without some employer
contribution these workers may also be priced out of health insurance.
Third, we need employers who already subsidize employer-
sponsored insurance to continue to contribute to their employees' health
insurance. Most people in this country get health insurance through their
employers and employer contributions play a crucial role in making
health insurance affordable for most American families.
Fourth, expanding health insurance requires mechanisms to prompt
both large and small employers who do not presently contribute toward
their employees' health insurance to do so. Encouraging large employers
to contribute toward their employees' health insurance helps level the
playing field among large employers. Bringing in contributions from
small employers helps stabilize employer-sponsored insurance as
employment shifts from large to small firms.
Health insurance rates among smaller employers are a critical
consideration in health insurance reform efforts because small employers
face particular problems in purchasing group insurance. Their premiums
tend to be higher because administrative costs are dramatically higher in
the small group market-25% compared to 5% in the large group
markets.37 Moreover, when permitted by state law, insurers risk rate
small groups charging higher prices to small businesses who have
employees with ongoing health needs often pricing them out of the group
health insurance market.
Reform efforts aimed solely at increasing health insurance coverage
among those who work for large employers can have a significant impact
on uninsurance rates-almost 30% of uninsured workers in Missouri
work for very large firms of over a thousand workers.38 However, these
efforts will not solve the problem for most uninsured workers.
37. Steffie Wollhandler et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the United States and
Canada, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 768, 771 (2003).
38. TIMOTHY MCBRIDE ET. AL., THE MASSACHUSETTS PLAN: A MODEL FOR MISSOURI? 11
(2006), http://www.mffh.org/MassachusettsPlanModelMissouri.pdf
1340 [Vol. 55
THE ROAD FROM MASSACHUSETTS TO MISSOURI
Fifth, increasing health insurance coverage also requires mechanisms
to bring younger, healthier, lower cost individuals into public and private
health insurance pools to help reduce the per person cost of coverage and
to assure that people get preventive care.39 Attracting healthy people-
and their premium contributions-into health insurance pools also
eliminates the problem posed by "free riders" who have access to
affordable health insurance but choose not to participate, and then have
inadequate personal income to cover the cost of services when they get
sick.4°
The Massachusetts Model is a comprehensive reform initiative that
uses a variety of strategies to address these different issues. All are
incremental approaches that build on existing public Medicaid coverage
and private employer-sponsored and individual insurance markets.
II. ADAPTING THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL TO OTHER STATES: THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006, the legislation creating the
Massachusetts Model of health reform, is a seemingly giddy array of
Medicaid changes, subsidized insurance offerings, insurance market
reforms, safety-net changes, individual and employer mandates, and
more. 41 Yet, at the core of the Massachusetts Model are five relatively
straightforward health insurance reform strategies. Three voluntary
strategies are designed to make health insurance more affordable for both
individuals and businesses: (1) a Medicaid expansion covers the lowest
income adults and children up to 300% of the FPL; (2) a Private
Insurance Premium Assistance program offers sliding scale coverage to
adults with incomes up to 300% of the FPL; and (3) a voluntary Private
Insurance Purchasing Pool makes group insurance more affordable for
small businesses and individual policies more affordable for those
earning over 300% of the FPL.42  Two mandatory strategies-an
employer mandate and an individual mandate-encourage individuals to
purchase insurance and employers to contribute toward the cost of
39. Joint Caucus for House Members, Health Care Reform: Conference Committee Bill
Massachusetts Legislature, Apr. 3, 2006, at 13, http://www.mass.gov/legis/presentation.pdf
[hereinafter Joint Caucus].
40. For a discussion of health insurance from the workers' perspective, see generally Claudia L
Schur et al., Workers' Perspectives on Mandated Employer Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., WEB
EXCLUSIVES, Mar. 2004, w4.
41. McDonough et al., supra note 2, at w420.
42. See MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 38, at app.A.
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employer-sponsored insurance.43 The employer and individual mandates
establish a legal environment that encourages health insurance
participation and also create opportunities for raising revenues to help
fund subsidized Medicaid and Premium Assistance coverage for lower
income residents.
This section examines the legislative and regulatory framework
needed to create these five reform initiatives identifying which details are
set forth in Chapter 58 and which are left to be developed during the
implementation process. This section also identifies the statutory and
regulatory framework that other states need to put in place if they wish to
replicate the Massachusetts Model.
A. Voluntary Strategies Designed to Make Insurance More Affordable
1. Medicaid
First, Chapter 58 expands Massachusetts's Medicaid and State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) program, called
MassHealth, to the maximum extent permitted by federal law and
authorized by the Commonwealth's Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver. 4
The statute expands MassHealth to cover children up to 300% of the FPL
and adults who are parents, elderly, long term unemployed, and HIV+ up
to 200% of the FPL. Children and adults with disabilities at any income
level can pay a sliding scale premium to buy into MassHealth. 45  The
43. Id.
44. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 6, at 12 tbl.8; see also, Federal Financial Participation in State
Assistance Expenditures, FY 2006, http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/fmap06.htm.
45. Prior to reform, MassHealth provided Medicaid and SCHIP coverage for children with
incomes up to 200% of the FPL, the upper limit allowed by federal statutory law. Massachusetts has
a Section 1115 Waiver that allows it to cover more categories of adults and at higher income limits
than those authorized by the federal Medicaid Act. Thus Massachusetts covered not just adults who
are parents, disabled and elderly but also adults who are long term unemployed and those who are
HIV+ with incomes up to 200% of the FPL. The Massachusetts Waiver also authorized the
Commonwealth to extend MassHealth coverage to disabled children and adults who buy-in to
MassHealth on a sliding premium scale with no upper income limit. Chapter 58 expands
MassHealth Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility for children from 200% to 300% of the FPL. An Act
Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, ch. 118E, § 9A. For adults, Chapter 58 removes
enrollment caps that had resulted in waiting lists for some categories of adults. Id. § 107. It also
expands parent eligibility for Insurance Partnership Premium Assistance, a program that subsidizes
employer provided health insurance, from 200 to 300% of the FPL. Id. § 9C. The legislation also
earmarks $3 million in state funds for outreach and enrollment activities by hospitals, community
clinics and community based organizations. Id. § 104. In fact, as far-reaching as the MassHealth
expansions may seem, most of those to be newly covered by Medicaid and SCHIP under the
Massachusetts Model-50,000 out of 92,500--are children and parents already eligible but not
enrolled. Press Release, Commonwealth of Mass., Survey Reveals 88,000 Reduction among State's
Uninsured (Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=pressreleases&agld=Eeohhs2&prMod
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legislation expands the Medicaid benefits package to include all optional
as well as mandatory services allowed by the federal Medicaid Act-
including dental services, dentures, and eyeglasses.46 It also raises
MassHealth reimbursement rates closer to Medicare rates to ensure that
physicians and hospitals will participate in the expanded program and
ties future rate increases to performance standards.47
Maximizing Medicaid and SCHIP coverage is a savvy fiscal move
for states looking to expand health insurance coverage because the
federal government matches every dollar the state spends on
Medicaid/SCHIP. While the federal Medicaid and SCHIP rate varies by
state, the average federal match rate is 60.19% for Medicaid and 72.13%
for SCHIP.48 The Massachusetts rate is 50% for Medicaid and 65% for
SCHIP.
49
However, state Medicaid and SCHIP expansions are circumscribed
by parameters set forth in the federal Medicaid and SCHIP law. The
federal Medicaid statute gives states considerable flexibility to expand
Medicaid to cover a long list of optional eligibility groups and categories
of coverage, but states must obtain a waiver from the Secretary of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") to use Medicaid or SCHIP to cover
individuals and services not otherwise authorized by federal law. Most
of the Massachusetts Medicaid and SCHIP expansions are authorized by
federal Medicaid and SCHIP law, but some elements require a Section
1115 Waiver, a type of waiver which gives the Secretary of HHS broad
authority to waive provisions of the federal Medicaid and SCHIP laws
but also requires the state to document that the cost of operating under
the waiver will be budget neutral in terms of federal matching dollars.
The federal Medicaid Act grants states looking to copy the
Massachusetts Model sufficient authority to expand Medicaid income
eligibility for parents and the elderly up to 100% of the FPL and as high
Name=eohhspressrelease&prFile=pr 060828_uninsurednumbersreduced.xml.
46. An Act Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, § 53. The Massachusetts legislation
restored optional services for adults eliminated in 2002, including adult dental services, dentures,
and eyeglasses.
47. Id. § 13B. The statute raises MassHealth provider reimbursement rates from 80% to 90%
of Medicare rates, and ties future Medicaid rate increases to specific performance goals related to
quality, efficiency, reduction of racial and ethnic disparities, and improved outcomes for patients.
Id.
48. See Notice of Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures, 69 Fed.
Reg. 68,370 (Nov. 24, 2004) (listing percentages for the fifty states and the District of Columbia for
October 1, 2005 through September 30, 2006).
49. Id. In Missouri, the federal share is 61.93% for Medicaid and 73.35% for SCHIP.
MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 6, at 12 tbl.8.; see also, Federal Financial Participation in State
Assistance Expenditures, FY 2006, http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/fmap06.htm.
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as 250% of the FPL for those with disabilities. 50  However, states will
need Section 1115 Waiver approval to extend Medicaid to adults who are
not parents, elderly, or disabled.5' States also need CMS waiver
approval to expand Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility for children above
200% of the FPL.
2. Private Insurance Premium Assistance
Chapter 58 also creates a Private Insurance Premium Assistance
program that qualifies for federal Medicaid matching funds. Called the
Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program, the Premium Assistance
Program subsidizes private insurance premiums for uninsured adults with
household incomes up to 300% of the FPL who are not eligible for
Medicaid.
52
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(ii) (2000) (describing which groups can be added for
coverage at the option of the states); 42 C.F.R. § 435.230 (2006) (describing optional coverage for
the elderly and disabled); see also ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID &
THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 10, 13-14 (2000), http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/2236-index.cfm (discussing eligibility requirements for low income parents). The
MassHealth eligibility category which allows children and adults with disabilities to buy in to
Medicaid by paying a sliding scale premium is authorized by the Commonwealth's Section 1115
Waiver. States not wishing to apply for a waiver can use the federal Medicaid statute's optional
Ticket to Work eligibility category to cover adults with disabilities with incomes up to 250% of the
FPL. Statutes have great flexibility in defining the kind of work activities that allow people with
disabilities to use this pathway to eligibility. For a detailed explanation of the relation of the
Medicaid Buy-In Program to the Ticket-to-Work program, see SARAH R. DAVIS & HENRY T. IREYS,
How DOES THE MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAM RELATE TO OTHER FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
ACCESS TO HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES? (2006), http://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/publications/pdfs/buyinprogram.pdf.
51. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 50, at 16 (discussing extending Medicaid coverage using
Section 1115 waivers). CMS has already approved Section 1115 waivers to allow several states to
cover childless, non-disabled parents. It has also granted waivers to various states to expand
eligibility levels for parents. For a full listing of waivers by state, see State Coverage Initiatives,
Matrix Glossary, Medicaid, SCHIP, and Federal Authority, http://statecoverage.net/matrix/
waivers.htm.
52. An Act Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, ch. 118E, § 3. Since the
Massachusetts legislation expands Medicaid/SCHIP coverage to children up to 300% of the FPL, the
private insurance premium assistance program provides coverage for adults-both individual
coverage and coverage for couples. The legislation provides that only uninsured individuals with
household incomes up to 300% of the FPL who are not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare, and
whose employers do not offer subsidized insurance qualify for the Premium Assistance Program.
However, it also allows the directors of the programs to allow employees whose employers pay at
least 20% of the cost for individual or 33% of the cost of family coverage may also participate, but
the employer must contribute towards the cost of the Premium Assistance policy. This provision is
designed to guard against "crowd-out," the concern that publicly subsidized health insurance will
result in individuals dropping private coverage in favor of public coverage. Id. § 2 (stating that the
program "is designed to reach low-income uninsured residents and maximize their enrollment in the
program").
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The Premium Assistance Program only insures adults because
children are covered through Medicaid and SCHIP. It wraps around
Medicaid eligibility for adults insuring that childless adults with incomes
below 200% of the FPL who do not qualify for MassHealth as well as
other uninsured adults with incomes between 200% and 300% of FPL
who earn too much to qualify for MassHealth have a source of sliding
scale insurance.53
The program is administered by a new independent public entity, the
Connector Authority, in consultation with the state's Office of
Medicaid,54  and only policies purchased through the Connector are
eligible for Premium Assistance subsidies.55 Participating individuals
pay their sliding scale premium, if any, to the Connector Authority which
then pays the full premium amount to the private insurance plan. 56 To
ease the transition to a private insurance-based system for the state's
safety net providers, the statute specifies that for the first three years of
the program, as long as enrollment targets are met, only managed care
organizations participating in MassHealth will be permitted to sell
Premium Assistance policies.5 7
The legislation specifies that Premium Assistance policies offered to
adults with incomes below 100% of the FPL are to have benefits and co-
payments similar to Medicaid coverage. 58  It also stipulates that
individuals with incomes below 100% of the FPL are eligible for full
premium assistance, paying nothing towards the premium cost.59  The
53. Id.§ 3(a). Uninsured residents of the state with incomes up to 300% of the FPL who are not
eligible for MassHealth, SCHIP or Medicare may participate in the private insurance premium
assistance program. Id.
54. Id. § 2.
55. See id. (stating "subsidies shall only be paid on behalf of an eligible individual who is
enrolled in a health plan that has been procured by the commonwealth health insurance connector
under said chapter 176Q").
56. Id. (stating "subsidies shall only be paid on behalf of an eligible individual who is enrolled
in a health plan that has been procured by the commonwealth health insurance connector under said
chapter 176Q.")
57. An Act Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, ch. 176G.
58. Id. ch. I 18H, § 6.
59. Id. Sliding scale premiums for those with incomes between 100 and 300% FPL will need
to be set at a level that attracts participation. Some policy experts suggest that health insurance
premiums need to be below 5% of income for individuals to consider premiums affordable.
However, other studies show that even 5% may be too high a premium level for lower income
Americans. A recent Urban Institute study of health insurance affordability concludes that the
median employee contribution towards premiums represents 1.5% of income for single coverage and
3.0% for family coverage, a figure that some are now proposing as the appropriate premium
contribution levels in Massachusetts. See JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., SETlING A STANDARD OF




Connector Authority is responsible for developing sliding scale
premiums and co-payments for those with incomes between 100 and
300% of the FPL.60  The legislation specifically prohibits Premium
Assistance policies from imposing deductibles.6'
The key legal issue for states interested in replicating the
Massachusetts Private Insurance Premium Assistance Program is
obtaining a Section 1115 Waiver from the Secretary of HHS to use
federal Medicaid matching funds to finance the private insurance
premium subsidies and to cover all adults up to 300% of the FPL. The
federal government has approved an amendment to Massachusetts's
Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver to allow the state to use federal Medicaid
matching funds to help pay the costs of the Premium Assistance
Program.62 This waiver includes permission to use federal Medicaid
money to cover childless adults and to raise income eligibility levels for
adults up to 300% of the FPL.
It seems likely that CMS will look favorably on other states' efforts
to use federal Medicaid and SCHIP matching funds to finance private
insurance subsides. CMS has actively promoted using Medicaid and
SCHIP funds to support private insurance subsidies through its 2001
Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) Section 1115
Waiver initiative. 63  The agency has approved a number of state
proposals to expand Medicaid eligibility using a variety of premium
assistance models.64 Of course, the challenge for any 1115 Waiver
application is the requirement for the state to show that the coverage
expansion will be revenue neutral in terms of federal matching dollars,
but the Massachusetts Waiver offers a template for other states' budget
neutrality calculations.65
60. An Act Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, ch. 18H.
61. Id. §6.
62. Letter from Mark McClellan, Administrator, Dep't of Health & Human Services, to
Timothy Murphy, Secretary, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Health & Human
Services (July 26, 2006), http://www.hcfama.org!_uploads/documents/live/Waiver-Approval_
Letter.pdf.
63. LAURA TOBLER, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HIFA
DEMONSTRATION INITIATIVE (2003), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/hifa.htm. The Deficit
Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 expands states' ability to implement Premium Assistance programs
for individuals already covered by state Medicaid programs. However, states still need CMS
approval to use federal Medicaid funds to support Premium Assistance programs for the purpose of
expanding Medicaid coverage.
64. National Academy for State Health Policy, Premium Assistance Toolbox for States,
http://www.patoolbox.org/_docdisp_page.cfm?LID=A27DFE 16-1 FOF-4329-942794AI 7CF0547B.
65. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Research and Demonstration Projects-
Section 1115, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGl/03_Research&
DemonstrationProjects-Section 1115.asp (defining "budget neutral" as the demonstration project not
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3. State-Authorized Private Insurance Purchasing Pool
The third health insurance expansion strategy is a state-authorized
Private Insurance Purchasing Pool, dubbed the Commonwealth Health
Insurance Connector. The Purchasing Pool is designed to make health
insurance more affordable for small businesses and those with incomes
above 300% of the FPL who rely on individual policies.66 The Pool is
administered by the Connector Board, the same independent public entity
that administers the Private Insurance Premium Assistance Program. 67
The Connector is not authorized to act as the purchaser for the Pool,
instead it grants its seal of approval to products that may be sold through
the Pool based upon standards it promulgates for cost and quality.68
Prior to passage of Chapter 58, Massachusetts already aggressively
regulated the small-group and individual insurance markets requiring
standardized policies, guaranteed issue, and modified community rated
premiums. 69 Health insurance premiums were not allowed to vary based
upon health status, claims experience, or gender, although they did vary
based upon age, family size, geographic location, and industry.7 °
Chapter 58 merges the small group and individual markets to create a
larger insurance pool and greater economies of scale. Predictions were
that the merger of the small group and individual markets would
decrease the cost of individual insurance by as much as 25% while
raising premiums for small employers slightly.7'
Chapter 58 also authorizes reforms to the private insurance market
designed specifically to make health insurance more affordable for
costing the Federal government more than it would cost without a waiver).
66. An Act Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, ch. 176Q.
67. Id. ch. 176J § 1. Premiums could not vary based upon health status, claims experience, or
gender, although they varied based upon age, family size, geographic location, and occupation.
68. Id. ch. 176Q § 3(3). Chapter 58 authorizes the Connector to market policies to individuals
and small groups in the newly merged, modified community rated market that meet standards it
promulgates for high quality and good value. Id. §§ 5, 10. The reform legislation leaves in place
almost all existing insurance mandates. However, it declares a moratorium on new mandates, and
repeals the Commonwealth's "any willing provider" law so that HMOs and PPOs may sell plans
with more restricted provider networks. Id. ch. 176G, § 16A.
69. See MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 38, at 7 App. D (identifying how Chapter 58, section 76
amends M.G.L. 176J(1) existing standards for "modified community rating").
70. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 6, at 21. "The law also reduces waiting periods for those who
have not had previous health insurance, while leaving in place existing limits on deductibles, co-
payments, and coinsurance." Id.
71. Joint Caucus, supra note 39, at 4; see also GORMAN ACTUARIAL, LLC ET AL., IMPACT OF
MERGING THE MASSACHUSETTS NON-GROUP AND SMALL GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS 10
(2006), http://www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs/doi/Legal_Hearings/NonGrpSmallGrp/FinalReport 12




young adults. The legislation provides that young adults may continue
on their parents' plans for up to two years after they are no longer
dependents or until age 25, whichever occurs first.72 It also authorizes
the Connector to offer specially designed, lower-cost products for 19-26
year olds.73
The legislation also mandates that employers with eleven or more
full time workers set up Section 125 cafeteria plans through the Internal
Revenue Service to allow employees to use pre-tax dollars to purchase
insurance.74 This helps reduce the cost of insurance for higher income
individuals who contribute to employer-sponsored plans as well as
individuals who use the Connector to purchase individual policies.
States like Massachusetts that already use modified community
rating or some other method for setting premiums in the small group and
individual markets should have statutory and regulatory frameworks in
place to provide the administrative structure within which a Connector-
type Purchasing Pool can operate. These states will need to consolidate
their small group and individual markets, but their biggest challenge will
be agreeing on the standards for coverage and cost of policies offered
through the Pool, matters that Chapter 58 delegates to the Connector
Board.
However, states like Missouri that allow insurers to risk rate in the
individual and small group markets face different legal challenges in
developing a Private Insurance Purchasing Pool. These states could
merge their small group and individual markets, develop standardized
policies, and institute modified community rating for all policies sold in
the newly merged market. However, unlike the merger of
Massachusetts's already community rated market-where predictions are
that individual premium prices will fall substantially while small group
prices will increase only fractionally, the move to market-wide
community rating will initially result in increased premiums costs for
many-likely half-of all policy holders.
72. An Act Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, ch. 175, § 108.
73. Id. ch. 176J, § 10.
74. Id. ch. 151 F. Section 125 plans do not require any employer contribution. Employers who
do not set up Section 125 Cafeteria Plans will be assessed a "Free Rider Surcharge" if their
employees are repeat users of the Commonwealth's Uncompensated Care Pool, costing the pool
more than $50,000 in one year. Id. ch.118G, § 18B. Employers are subject to the charge if their
employees use the free care pool a total of five times per year in the aggregate, or if any one
employee uses free care more than three times. This surcharge "shall be greater than 10%, but no
greater than 100% of the cost to the state" of the free care, with the first $50,000 of costs exempted.
Id.
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For states like Missouri that allow risk rating for the small group and
individual markets, a more incremental step towards the Massachusetts
Model would be legislation authorizing a voluntary Private Insurance
Purchasing Pool that offers individuals and small groups access to a
choice of standardized private insurance plans with premiums set at
modified community rates while allowing the existing risk-rated small
group and individual insurance markets to remain intact. In this
scenario, the voluntary Purchasing Pool creates economies of scale and
reduces administrative costs, but also acts as a large purchaser
negotiating premium rates with private plans that wish to offer policies
through the Pool.
A large, voluntary Private Insurance Purchasing Pool should be able
to lower premium costs for individuals and small groups by lowering
administrative costs, presently estimated to be as high as 25% in the
individual and small group markets.75 Moreover, it may also be able to
offer lower premium prices by spreading the risk-and the cost-among
a large enough number of individuals to bring down the average
premium price.
However, a voluntary Purchasing Pool operating in a state that
allows risk rating in the individual and small group market must attract
enough healthy individuals to be able to spread the costs of those with
substantial medical needs.76 Modified community rated Purchasing Pool
premiums must be low enough that healthy individuals will use the Pool
rather than purchase risk-rated policies on their own, outside the Pool.
This adverse selection problem always arises when voluntary purchasing
pools must compete with risk-rated premiums.
A number of design features can help ensure that a voluntary pool
enacted as part of a larger Massachusetts Model is large enough and
stable enough to help counteract adverse selection. These include
combining the subsidized Private Insurance Premium Assistance
enrollees with the Private Purchasing Pool enrollees, marketing special
plans through the Pool designed to attract healthier young adults, and
implementing an individual mandate to encourage individuals who
would otherwise go without insurance to purchase insurance.77 For
example, in Missouri, a voluntary purchasing pool that combined small
75. Wollhandleret al., supra note 37, at 771.
76. ELLIOT K. WICKS, MISSOURI FOUNDATION FOR HEALTH, EXPANDING COVERAGE
THROUGH THE MISSOURI CONSOLIDATED HEALTH CARE PLAN (MCHCP) 5 (2006).
77. LISA CLEMANS-COPE ET AL., MISSOURI FOUNDATION FOR HEALTH, HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE
HEALTH PLANS WITH HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: EMERGING EVIDENCE AND OUTSTANDING
ISSUES 5-7 (2006), www.mfth.org/CoverMolO.pdf.
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businesses and individuals with subsidized Private Insurance Premium
Assistance enrollees could cover as many as 500,000 working age, non-
disabled adults. In a pool this large, risk should be spread broadly
enough to allow the pool to negotiate less costly, more affordable
premium rates.78
B. Mandates to Encourage Health Insurance Participation
But voluntary health insurance cannot and will not result in universal
health insurance coverage: There is no guarantee that the more healthy or
the less wealthy will opt to purchase health insurance. In Massachusetts,
predictions were that the three voluntary insurance expansion
initiatives-Medicaid, Private Insurance Premium Assistance, and the
Purchasing Pool-would likely reduce the number of uninsured by
40%. 7 9 While this is a substantial accomplishment, it would still leave
284,000 Massachusans uninsured.8 °
These figures-and this reality-prompted Massachusetts to move
beyond voluntary health insurance expansions to mandate that both
employers and individuals participate in the health insurance system or
pay a penalty. Not only do the mandates help nudge the state toward one
hundred percent health insurance coverage, but they also help stabilize
the three health insurance pools created by the voluntary health insurance
expansion initiatives. To a lesser degree, they also create opportunities
for raising revenue to help finance MassHealth and Private Insurance
Premium Assistance costs.
1. Employer Mandate
The Massachusetts employer "play or pay" mandate requires
employers with eleven or more full-time equivalent employees to
provide a "fair and reasonable" premium contribution toward their
employees' health insurance or pay an annual "Fair Share Contribution"
78. The Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan (MCHCP) presently covers 104,000 state
employees, dependents and retirees and has been able to negotiate quite competitive per month
premium rates. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 6, at 24.
79. JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., BUILDING THE ROADMAP TO COVERAGE: POLICY CHOICES AND
THE COST AND COVERAGE IMPLICATIONS 29 (2005). The Urban Institute used data showing that
9.4% of Massachusetts residents were uninsured and estimated that voluntary strategies would
reduce that number to 5.7% leaving 60% of the uninsured still uninsured. Id. In terms of the
number of uninsured voluntary initiatives could reduce the number of uninsured from 532,000 to
211,000, but leave 321,000 people without health insurance. Id. at 7.
80. Id.
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assessment of up to $295 per employee. 81 The legislation does not define
a "fair and reasonable" employer contribution leaving that determination
to be promulgated through rule making by a state agency, the
Massachusetts Division of Health Care Financing and Policy.
8 2
A penalty of $295 per employee per year seems astonishingly low
given that the average cost of single employer sponsored coverage was
$4,242 in 2006.3 Yet, the low penalty is justified because it is based
upon the estimated private-sector share of the average per worker cost
for care paid for by the Commonwealth's Uncompensated Care Pool for
workers whose employers do not provide health insurance. If
Uncompensated Care Pool costs rise or fall in future years, the annual
assessment will adjust accordingly.
The employer mandate was possibly the most hotly contested piece
of the reform legislation. Some stakeholders felt strongly that employers
should continue to play a role in financing health insurance coverage,
while others-including Governor Romney, whose veto of the employer
mandate was overridden by the legislature-were strongly opposed to an
employer mandate.84 The continuing existence of the mandate paired
with a low penalty is part of the political compromise that kept the
mandate in the reform package.
Moreover, it remains unclear whether a state imposed employer
"play or pay" mandate is preempted by the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).85 Many are hopeful that such
"play or pay" provisions will not violate ERISA's prohibition on direct
regulation of employer health plans, but the ultimate fate of these laws is
yet to be determined by the courts. 86 One side benefit of
Massachusetts's low penalty is that no employer has challenged the
provision: a low penalty is a political compromise.
Most importantly, though, an employer mandate cannot achieve
universal coverage. An employer mandate only requires employers to
81. An Act Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, ch. 149, § 188.
82. Id. The statute specifically provides that the regulations setting a "fair and reasonable"
employer contribution must be presented to the legislature for approval prior to implementation. Id.
83. 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 34.
84. 'Pam Belluc & Katie Zezima, Massachusetts Legislation on Insurance Becomes Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/us/13health.html?_r-3&oref-login&
orefrslogin.
85. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding
Maryland's Fair Share Health Fund Act was preempted by ERISA).
86. For an overview of state efforts to circumvent ERISA, see National Conference of State
Legislatures, Massachusetts Passes Universal Health Care Package "An Act Providing Access to




offer health insurance to employees who qualify for employer sponsored
coverage: it does not reach part-time, temporary, or seasonal workers
who typically do not qualify for employer sponsored insurance.87 An
employer mandate also has no impact on those workers who qualify for
employer sponsored insurance but "opt out" of their employer's health
plan and remain uninsured either because of cost concerns or a perceived
lack of immediate need for medical care and insurance to cover the costs
of care. Thus, the Massachusetts Model also incorporates an individual
mandate as well as the employer mandate.
2. Individual Mandate
An individual mandate offers states a creative way to bypass the
potential ERISA problems posed by an employer mandate and encourage
employees to take up employer sponsored health insurance when it is
offered. An individual mandate can specify a minimum level of benefits
that must be held by each person, thus providing a strong-albeit
indirect-incentive for employers to provide policies that would, at a
minimum, allow their workers to meet that standard.88
The Massachusetts Model's individual mandate requires that adult
residents of the Commonwealth "obtain and maintain" health insurance
so long as "affordable" coverage meeting minimum standards is
available. 89 Residents must report compliance on their state income tax
returns and the State Department of Revenue assesses income tax
penalties against those who cannot document coverage. 90 For 2007 the
statutes set the penalty as loss of the personal income tax exemption,
about $218 for an individual and $437 for a family.91 In 2008 and
thereafter, the penalty rises to half the cost of a minimally acceptable
"affordable" insurance plan.92
The newly authorized Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector
Board is charged with developing regulations defining "affordable" and
87. Joint Caucus, supra note 39; JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., ROADMAP TO COVERAGE: SYNTHESIS
OF FINDINGS (2005).
88. HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 11-12. Some have been concerned that employer
mandates--or individual mandates that prompt employer contributions-would have a negative
impact on employment and wages. However, studies in Massachusetts show that even a fairly
robust pay or play provision has only a small marginal impact of the overall plan on economic
activity, employment and wages. Id. at 11- 12.
89. An Act Providing Access to Health Care, supra note 1, ch. I 11M.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. ch. 1IIM, § 2b.
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minimally adequate health insurance. 93 While Massachusetts, like every
state, has a variety of mandated benefits that health insurance must
cover,94 Chapter 58 contains no details about the scope of benefits,
deductibles and out of pocket limits, or whether Healthcare Savings
Accounts (HSAs) accompanied by catastrophic health insurance plans
will satisfy the individual mandate's minimum coverage requirements. 95
The legislation leaves these details to the newly formed Connector Board
and sets in motion an ongoing public dialogue about what kind of
insurance is adequate and affordable.
Some commentators question whether the Massachusetts individual
mandate will actually result in universal coverage, pointing out that since
the statutory penalty is only half the cost of purchasing health insurance
deemed to be "adequate" and "affordable" some-and maybe many-
Massachusans may choose to pay the penalty rather than purchase health
insurance.96  Proponents of the Massachusetts legislation acknowledge
this limitation, but hope that the individual mandate will set in motion an
ongoing public conversation which prompts creation of heath insurance
products that people will want and be able to purchase.
93. Id. Regulators are debating a variety of approaches to defining affordability including
using Medicaid and SCHIP standards, average household budgets (as a means to determine the
income available to pay for health insurance), and current spending on private health insurance
coverage (as an indicator of the amount that individuals and families are willing and able to pay).
HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 6. The statute does not require that "affordability" levels match
the rates for the sliding fee Premium Assistance program. However, the Connector Board is charged
with developing both levels and expectations are that the Board will set affordability rates that match
the sliding scale rates. Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, Affordability
Standards Recommended to Connector Board (2007), http://www.mass.gov/Qhic/docs/
Affordabilitypr_4.11.07.doc.
94. See HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
(2006), http://www.mass.gov/legis/summary.pdf. Chapter 58 also places a moratorium on new state
legislatively imposed health insurance benefits through 2008.
95. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2004-2006 STATE LEGISLATION ON
HEALTH CARE SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS (2006).
96. "The requirement has been likened to the requirement imposed on motorists to obtain
automobile insurance." Press Release, Mintz Levin, Massachusetts Enacts Landmark Health Care
Reform Bill: An Overview of H. 4850, An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality,
Accountable Health Care (Apr. 21, 2006), www.mintz.com/news/news/657/
MassachusettsEnactsLandmarkHealthCareReformBillAnOverview of H_4850_AnAct_
ProvidingAccess toAffordableQualityAccountableHealthCare. In Massachusetts, the
penalty for violating the affordable insurance mandate is equivalent to only 50% of the cost of
affordable insurance. Id. When the cost of non-compliance is less than the cost of complying with
the law, people are more likely to pay the penalty rather than obtain insurance.
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C. In Sum
Thus, replicating the Massachusetts Model in other states requires
statutory and regulatory authority for a variety of health insurance
expansion building blocks. First, states need statutory authority to
expand Medicaid and SCHIP up to the maximum levels allowed by
federal law and available Section 1115 Waivers. Second, state
legislation and federal waiver approval is needed to create a Medicaid-
funded Private Insurance Premium Assistance Program to subsidize
health insurance for those with incomes up to 300% of the FPL who are
not eligible for Medicaid or other public coverage. Third, statutory
authority is required to create a Private Insurance Purchasing Pool for
those with incomes over 300% of the FPL who depend on the small
group and individual markets for health insurance. Finally, state law
needs to create both an employer and an individual "play or pay"
mandate to help bring healthier individuals into these health insurance
pools to make them larger and more stable so that the costs of health
insurance are more affordable for all.
Replicating the statutory and regulatory framework of the
Massachusetts Model requires an understanding of Medicaid law and the
state's health insurance regulatory environment. Ultimately, though,
replicating the legal framework of the Massachusetts Model is not
difficult. What may be more challenging is financing the costs of the
reform strategies.
III. ADAPTING THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL: COSTS AND FINANCING
Politics and ideology aside, the greatest challenge that Missouri and
other states face in trying to duplicate a Massachusetts Model of health
reform are the costs and public financing needed to support the Model.
Massachusetts was able to develop consensus, in part, because the Model
does not impose substantial new costs on employers, individuals, or the
state. The public funding is made easier because more than half of the
public costs are covered through federal Medicaid and SCHIP matching
funds. Financing the state's share of the costs is predicted to require only
$125 million annually in new state funding because almost all the state's
share of the public costs can be paid for by shifting $1 billion from an
existing uncompensated care pool into insurance subsidies.97
97. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 3.
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Replicating the Massachusetts Model will almost certainly be more
costly for other states. Massachusetts has one of the lowest uninsured
rates in the country which means fewer residents need health insurance
coverage. Moreover, Massachusetts is also a high income state with
fewer very poor and near poor uninsured residents needing publicly
funded private premium assistance, Medicaid and SCHIP. Finally,
Massachusetts is likely the only state that has a $1 billion uncompensated
care pool that can be shifted to fund insurance subsidies.
Understanding the costs and financing options for duplicating the
Massachusetts Model in Missouri offers lessons for other states that may
look more like Missouri than Massachusetts. Missouri is typical of many
states. It has a relatively high percentage of very poor and near poor
residents who will need public funding to help cover all or part of the
costs for health insurance. It does not have an uncompensated care pool,
but, like other states, it does appropriate substantial funding for
uncompensated care. Missouri voters, like those in many other states,
are loath to impose higher income taxes on residents, but a variety of
other targeted revenue sources could fund the state's share of a
Massachusetts Model of health reform in Missouri. What is possible in
Missouri may be possible in other states as well.
To move Missouri to universal health insurance requires covering
847,000 uninsured children and adults. 98 In Missouri, a Massachusetts
Model of health reform covers the uninsured as follows. The Medicaid
and SCHIP expansion covers 254,000-30% of the uninsured-
including all children with incomes up to 300% of the FPL and the
lowest income adults. 99 The Private Insurance Premium Assistance
98. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 38 App. B. Simulated Eligibility for Insurance and Costs of
Coverage under a Massachusetts-Style Plan in Missouri, at note 53 et seq. All figures are for 2006.
Data is based upon individual level data drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS),
supplemented with data to take account of 135,000 Missouri residents who lost Medicaid coverage
in 2005. Id.
99. Id. at 13, 17-21. In setting income cut-offs for Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility we followed
the parameters of the federal Medicaid Act and Missouri's existing Section 1115 Waiver to reduce,
as much as possible, the need for Missouri to obtain new Section 1115 waivers. Thus, we assumed
that Medicaid and SCHIP would cover children up to 300% of the FPL, parents and the elderly up to
100% of the FPL, and adults with disabilities up to 250% of the FPL. Missouri already covers
children up to 300% of the FPL pursuant to a Section 1115 Waiver. Presently, Missouri's income
eligibility limits for parents and other adults are extremely low: 18-22% of the FPL for parents and
85% of the FPL for the disabled and elderly. Mo. REV. STAT. § 208.151 (2006). Missouri has a
Section 1115 Waiver to cover other groups of parents including non-custodial parents, but the state
does not have Section 1115 approval to cover childless adults or HIV+ individuals before they
become permanently and totally disabled. Missouri's Section 1115 Waiver already authorizes parent
eligibility up to, and in some cases above, 100% of the FPL. The budget neutrality calculations that
govern that waiver would likely accommodate even higher income limit for parents than those
authorized by the federal Medicaid statute and implementing regulations. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra
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Program covers 398,000 adults-47% of the uninsured-wrapping
around Medicaid eligibility to cover other uninsured adults with incomes
up to 300% of the FPL.100 The Private Insurance Purchasing Pool covers
93,170 people- 11% of the uninsured-with incomes over 300% of the
FPL who now rely on the small group or individual market. 10' We
calculate that the individual mandate will prompt all those with incomes
over 300% of the FPL who are presently offered employer sponsored
health insurance but not enrolled to do so, resulting in 12% of the
currently uninsured or 101,640 people obtaining employer sponsored
coverage. We assume that the employer play or pay mandate would not
prompt any employers who do not presently offer health insurance to
begin doing so. Instead, we assume that these employees will obtain
individual coverage through the newly created Private Insurance
Purchasing Pool. 102
Figure 5. How the Massachusetts Model













Source: Timothy McBride et al., The Massachusetts Plan: A Model for
Missouri? (2006).
note 38, at tbl.III-1.
100. McBRIDE, et al., supra note 38, at 13-17. In selecting income cut-offs for the Medicaid
and SCHIP eligibility we followed the parameters of the federal Medicaid Act and Missouri's
existing Section 1115 Waiver to reduce, as much as possible, the need for the state to obtain new
Section 1115 waivers. However, for cost purposes, the eligibility line between Medicaid and the
Private Insurance Premium Assistance Program is unimportant because in determining costs we used
the same per person cost estimates for both programs.
101. Id.atl3,22-23.
102. Id. at 25.
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To calculate the costs of using a Massachusetts Model to cover the
uninsured in Missouri, we multiplied the number of people newly
covered through each expansion strategy by the cost per person.10 3 We
estimated the per person cost of new coverage using historic costs for
coverage in the state's Medicaid, SCHIP and state employee's health
insurance programs. 104 We increased historic Medicaid rates to reflect a
Medicaid benefit package that covered all services authorized by the
federal Medicaid statute. 10 5 Since Missouri, like Massachusetts, has very
low Medicaid physician reimbursement rates which have resulted in
limited physician participation, the cost estimates include a Medicaid
physician rate increase to bring payment rates closer to Medicare rates.
10 6
We also estimated across the board savings of 6% for all forms of health
insurance-individual, group, Medicaid, and SCHIP-as a result of
larger risk pools, administrative efficiencies, and reduced cost shifting
that result from universal coverage. 10 7  Other analysts calculate even
higher cost savings from universal coverage-10% or even more-but
we purposely chose a more conservative figure.
10 8
Using these figures, we calculate the net costs of covering all
uninsured Missourians using a Massachusetts Model of health reform to
be $2.6 billion in private and public funds.'0 9 The per person cost is
$3,070 a year, substantially below the $4,242 average cost for employer-
103. Id. at 53-54 App.B.
104. Id. at 53. The per member per month figures used are as follows: $350 for non-disabled
adults using employer-sponsored insurance, Private Purchasing Pool, or Premium Assistance
coverage for those over 100% of the FPL; $255 for non-disabled adults using Medicaid or Premium
Assistance up to 100% of the FPL; $1261 for disabled adults; $149 for children with incomes up to
100% of the FPL using Medicaid; $111 for children using SCHIP; $150 for the cost of adding
dependent coverage in the state employee plan. Id. at 53.
105. Id. at 19. Missouri eliminated a number of optional services for adults in 2005 because of
budget concerns including dental care, rehabilitation services, durable medical equipment, and
physical, occupational, and speech therapy. The cost estimates assume these services are reinstated.
Id.
106. Id. at 55. Missouri has one of the lowest Medicaid physician reimbursement rates in the
country, paying only 55% of Medicare rates. As a result, many physicians limit their participation in
Medicaid creating access problems for those with Medicaid coverage. MEDICAID REPORT, supra
note 8, at 25.
107. See MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 38, at 55 App.B ("as cost shifting from the uninsured
ends and as efficiency gains from buying insurance through a Purchasing Pool takes hold.").
108. See, e.g. KENNETH THORPE, A UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE PLAN FOR MISSOURI (2003),
http://www.mffh.org/ShowMe3.pdf.(estimating savings from universal coverage in the range of 10-
15%).
109. See McBRIDE ET AL., supra note 38, at 30 (detailing the net cost estimates and assumptions
of the simulations used to derive the estimates shown here). All cost estimates are for 2006 and
assume the initiative is adopted and implemented that year. Costs are not projected forward to future
years. Id. The Massachusetts Model is unlikely to result in one hundred percent health insurance
coverage, but estimates assume that it captures the maximum costs-both public and private-of
implementing such a Model.
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sponsored individual coverage in 2006.110 In terms of sources of
funding, implementing a Massachusetts Model of health reform in
Missouri produces a net savings to employers. The costs of the new
coverage are divided among individuals whose premiums cover 12%, the
state government pays 34%, and the federal government covers 54% of
the costs through federal Medicaid and SCHIP match.
Figure 6. Net Costs of Covering the Uninsured
in Missouri, by Source of Funding










Source: Timothy McBride et al., The Massachusetts Plan: A Model for
Missouri?, The Missouri Foundation for Health (2006).
Massachusetts style health reform offers a net savings to Missouri
employers even though employers who do not presently contribute to
employer sponsored insurance will see an increase in costs of
approximately $599 million. Their new costs are more than offset by
cost savings to employers who already subsidize employee health
insurance. Overall, employers should see savings of approximately $617
million. We assumed that the employer "play or pay" mandate would
not prompt any employers presently not offering health insurance to do
so. Instead, we factored the $295 per employee play or pay penalty into
their costs.l"'
Missouri residents will pay for 12% of the costs of covering the
uninsured though increased premium costs will run $326 million.
Overall premiums will drop by 6% under a Massachusetts Model, but
110. Id. at 30. This figure is derived by dividing $2.6 million in net costs by 847,000 uninsured.
111. Id. at 56-57.
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more individuals will purchase insurance through employer sponsored
insurance, the Private Insurance Purchasing Pool and the Private
Insurance Premium Assistance Program.' 12 The bulk of these premium
costs for individuals -61%-are shouldered by the 12% of uninsured
Missourians with incomes over 300% of the FPL. 113 Our cost estimates
assume that those with incomes below 300% of the FPL will contribute
sliding scale premiums in the Private Insurance Premium Assistance
program ranging from 0% for those with incomes below 100% of the
FPL and rising to 5.8% of income for those earning 300% of the FPL.
114
For example, a person earning 200% of the FPL-$19,800 a year for a
single person-would pay about $25 per month or roughly 2.9% of their
income towards their health insurance premiums. 115
A full 88% of the costs of funding the Massachusetts Model in
Missouri are financed by the state and federal governments.' 16  The
annual public financing needed to implement a Massachusetts Model in
Missouri is $892 million in state funds and $1.4 billion in federal
matching funds for Medicaid, SCHIP, and the new Medicaid-funded
Premium Assistance Program.117
Missouri does not have an uncompensated care pool that can be used
to help fund its share of the first year's cost for a Massachusetts Model of
health reform, but the state does allocate $327.3 million in state and local
funds to pay for uncompensated care, money that could be shifted to help
subsidize health insurance. 1 8  In 2005, Missouri contributed $160.7
million toward Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH)
payments to help reimburse hospitals for the costs of caring for
uninsured patients.1 19 It contributed another $14.8 million toward DSH
payments that fund a Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver that pays for
outpatient care for the uninsured in the St. Louis area.1 20 Finally, it spent
112. Id.at53.
113. See id. (noting that "only about 39% of the $544 million is borne by those between 100 and
300% of FPL").
114. Id.at3l tbl.4-1.
115. Id. at 31. The sliding scale contribution is as follows: 0-100% FPL, 0.0%; 101-125%,
0.7%; 126-150%, 1.5%; 151-175%, 2.2%; 176-200%, 2.9%; 201-225%, 3.6%; 251-275%, 5.1%,
276-300%, 5.8%. Id.
116. Id.at3O.
117. Id. "Currently, $335.4 million in federal Medicaid and SCHIP matching funds already
come to the State to help cover the cost of the uninsured. New matching funds of $1.07 billion
would be needed, some of which would likely need to be approved pursuant to a Medicaid Section
1115 waiver." Id. at 31.
118. Id.





an additional $151.8 million in state, county and local funds to fund other
health care services to the uninsured, including community clinics and
hospitals. 121  Shifting this state and local money to fund insurance
coverage rather than paying institutions to care for the uninsured would
cover more than a third of the funding needed to cover the states net cost
to implement the Massachusetts Model. 1
22
However, Missouri would still need $564.7 million in new state
revenue to fund its share of the costs of a Massachusetts Model of health
reform. 123 Over half a million dollars in new state funding is certainly a
challenge, but it is a relatively modest amount when compared to
Missouri's gross state product of $226 billion. 24  While Missouri
legislators have been loath in recent years to impose general state income
taxes, targeted sales taxes on medical care, health insurance premiums,
or smoking could raise more than enough new state revenue to cover the
state's share of a Massachusetts Model.
Missouri presently does not tax sales of most services including
medical services. A 2% sales tax on all medical services would raise
$628.4 million, more than enough to fully fund the state's share for a
Massachusetts Model. 125 Such a sales tax would raise the price of
medical services, but the reform is predicted to produce a 6% cost
savings so consumers should still see an overall drop in health insurance
and medical costs even if the plan is funded by a new medical services
tax.
121. Id. Unlike the state funding for Medicaid DSH, these funds are presently not matched by
federal Medicaid dollars. This money, if used to expand Medicaid or support a federally-approved
Private Insurance Premium Assistance program, could draw new federal Medicaid dollars to support
universal coverage in Missouri.
122. Missouri needs a Section 1115 Waiver to use DSH funds to pay for health insurance rather
than hospital care, but CMS has approved a number of such waivers and President Bush has
endorsed this approach. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE AFFORDABLE CHOICES INITIATIVE: AN
OVERVIEW (2007), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7637.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Missouri Economic Research and Information Center, Gross Domestic Product Data Series,
2006 Estimates, http://ded.mo.gov/researchandplanning/indicators/gsp/index.stm.
125. ECON. & POL'Y ANALYSIS RES. CTR., TAX EXPENDITURE REPORT: 2007 (2007),
http://eparc.missouri.edu/Publication/TAXESP/sales.pdf. Currently, Missouri generally taxes sales
of goods but not sales of services. At present, only eleven services are taxed including services such
as pet grooming, marina services, and residential gas. Sorting out the public policy issues on taxing
medical care requires balancing competing goals and issues. On the one hand, sales taxes tend to be
regressive and impact low-income families more, and taxation of medical services can sometimes
tax necessities or life-sustaining services. On the other hand, Medicaid, SCHIP, and the Premium
Assistance program should help cushion the impact on those with incomes up to 300% of the FPL.
Also, much research shows that more medical spending is consumed as a result of incentives in the
health care system, such as health insurance and tax incentives, perhaps leading to inefficient
medical spending. Moreover, the share of medical spending rises with income.
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Missouri could also raise $155 million in revenue by imposing a 2%
tax on health insurance policies sold in the state. 126 Missouri already
assesses a 2% tax on all other insurance premiums sales, only health
insurance premiums are exempted. In Missouri, a Massachusetts Model
of health reform is likely to result in sales of 461,000 new health
insurance policies and increased revenue for private insurers. Thus,
tying funding for the plan to health insurance premiums may be
appealing. On the other hand, a tax on health insurance premiums taxes
only those who purchase health insurance-individuals and small
groups. Large employers who self insure would escape this tax and thus
fail to contribute an equivalent share to the public costs of the health
reform model.
Missouri could also use a tobacco sales tax increase to help fund a
Massachusetts Model. Nationally, the average state tax on cigarette sales
is just over $1.00 a pack. 127 Missouri's tax of 17 cents per pack is the
second lowest in the nation.' 28  Raising Missouri's cigarette tax to 97
cents per pack and increasing the tax on other tobacco products by 20%
would generate $351 million a year, enough to fully fund Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") recommended smoking
cessation programs and raise $290 million per year for heath insurance
expansion. 1 2
9
Overall, even though the Massachusetts Model health reform would
require some form of new taxation, the Model would have a positive
effect on Missouri's economy. The plan would bring in over $1 billion
126. The Missouri Department of Insurance reports premiums received by all insurers
(excluding self-insured plans) is approximately $6.6 billion. MCBRIDE ET AL., supra note 38, at 74
n.73. In addition, it is estimated that insurers would collect another $1.15 billion in premiums for
the newly insured under a plan of universal coverage. If a 2% tax on all private insurance premiums
(equal to $7.8 billion) were to be assessed, preliminary calculations suggest that $155 million would
be raised. The state presently assesses a Medicaid Managed Care Organization Reimbursement
Allowance on net Medicaid revenue of managed care organizations that participate in the Medicaid
and SCHIP programs. The federal Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 prohibits this Medicaid-specific
tax. Broadening a health insurance tax would net approximately $100 million. A health insurance
premium tax does not reach those employers who self-insure.
127. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates and Rankings (Oct. 1,
2007), http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0097.pdf.
128. Id. The state with the lowest state cigarette tax is South Carolina at 7 cents per pack. Id.
129. According to the Committee for a Healthy Future, a 20% tax on tobacco products would
yield $351 million per year. After allocating $61 million to fully fund CDC recommended smoking
education and cessation programs, $290 million would be available to fund health insurance
coverage. Committee for a Healthy Future, Fact Sheet, http://www.healthymissouri.org/
FactSheet.pdf. Of course, one must acknowledge that Missouri voters have twice failed to pass a
ballot resolution to raise the Tobacco Tax. The last proposal, defeated in November 2006, would
have earmarked $102 million to restore Medicaid cuts, and $102 million for Medicaid physicians'
reimbursement rate increase. This initiative proposed increasing the state tax on cigarettes from
$0.17 to $0.97 per pack. Id. It also proposed a 20% tax increase on all other tobacco products. Id.
2007] 1361
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
in new federal Medicaid dollars to the state which would generate
additional income, wages, and ultimately increased tax revenue via
income tax and sales tax.130 Although Missouri would lose individual
income tax revenue because more individuals would be able to use pre-
tax dollars to purchase health care, the overall impact on the state's
economy would be positive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal frameworks that underlie the Massachusetts Model are
relatively straightforward. A Medicaid/SCHIP expansion covers
children and the poorest adults, while a Private Insurance Premium
Assistance program leverages federal Medicaid matching funds to
subsidize insurance for near-poor adults. A Private Insurance Purchasing
Pool creates economies of scale to make health insurance more
affordable for small businesses and individuals earning over 300% of the
FPL. The employer mandate provides an incentive-albeit a weak
one-for employers to continue to contribute toward their employees'
health insurance. The individual mandate seeks to bring healthier, less
costly individuals into the various health insurance pools.
The costs of implementing the Massachusetts Model in Missouri and
other states are substantial, but they are not prohibitive in terms of the
state dollars it requires: Creative use of federal Medicaid matching funds
pays for one-half to two-thirds the cost of health insurance expansions to
cover low income residents. New state revenue is needed, but the
amount-while large in dollar figures-is relatively modest in
comparison to overall state revenues, and well within the tax capacities
of even tax loathe states like Missouri.
This analysis shows that a Massachusetts Model for Missouri is
legally and financially possible for Missouri and other states-it can
happen. What will happen depends upon the political will of both
citizens and elected officials. Others in this symposium have written
about the political climate that made reform possible in Massachusetts.
We hope that this legal and fiscal analysis will prompt a public
conversation in Missouri and elsewhere about what should happen.
130. JOEL FERBER ET AL., ECONOMIC AND HEALTH BENEFITS OF MEDICAID (2004).
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